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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA IDA CORYELL MARTIN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ALBERT E. MARTIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14352 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce brought by Patricia Ida 
Coryell Martin, Plaintiff-Respondent, against Albert E. Martin, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial of the issues the Court, sitting without a 
jury, granted a decree of divorce to both parties and entered 
its order for division of their real, personal and business 
property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Patricia Ida Coryell Martin, seeks 
affirmance of the Lower Court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Respondent (hereinafter referred to as 
"Wife") and Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter referred to as 
"Husband") are actual and bona fide residents of Weber County, 
Utah, and were for more than three months prior to the commence-
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ment of this action. The plaintiff and defendant are husband 
and wife, having been intermarried on September 18, 1964, at 
Malad, Idaho. One child has been born as issue of this mar-
riage, to-wit: CODY BRET MARTIN, born June 2 4, 19 74. The 
parties acquired various assets and incurred debts and obli-
gations during the marriage. The trial court ordered the 
division of the property and the business known as Coryell 
Answering Service was awarded to the wife. The husband was 
awarded $11,000.00 for his interest in the business. This was 
to be paid within three (3) years at a rate of not less than 
$500.00 per month at eight percent (8%) per annum interest on 
the unpaid balance. This lien is to be subordinate to that of 
the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. H. C. Coryell. The husband was re-
quired to pay $75.00 per month to the wife as and for child sup-
port. The husband was not required to pay the wife alimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ITS 
DIVISION OF THE PROPERTY. 
The fundamental argument advanced by the husband is that 
the business assets could have been divided differently than the 
method chosen by the court. Even if the husband's assertions 
were grounded, there would not be legal basis for reversal. 
The rule of law is firmly established that "the trial 
judge will be indulged considerable latitude of discretion in 
adjusting the financial and property interest of the parties. . ." 
Martinett v. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d. 202, 331 P.2d. 821 (1958). 
The court in the same decision sighted "clear abuse of discre-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tion" as the standard for overturning the trial judgefs decision. 
There is no such "clear abuse" in this case. 
The court has often listed considerations that should be 
taken into account when dividing the assets of a marriage upon 
divorce. Appellant at Page 7 of his brief cites Wilson v. Wilson, 
5 Utah 2d. 79, 296 P.2d. 977 (1956). Appellant omitted many of 
the relevant considerations the trial judge is instructed to weigh. 
For example, the court states that the object is to allow a "just 
and equitable adjustment" of the property to allow the parties to 
"reconstruct their lives on a happy and use-
ful basis. In doing so, it is necessary for 
the court to consider, in addition to the 
relative guilt or innocence of the parties, 
an appraisal of all of the attendant facts 
and circumstances." 
The appellant also neglected to include the following 
important considerations enumerated by the court, viz.: 
". . .the duration of the marriage; the ages 
of the parties; their social positions and 
standards of living; their health; consider-
ations relative to children; the money and 
property they possess and how it was acquired; 
their capabilities and training and their 
present and potential incomes.4" (emphasis added). 
296 P.2d. at 979, 980. Footnote 4 cites, "For other lists of the 
factors to be considered see Pinion v. Pinion, supra [92 Utah 255 
67 P.2d. 265]; MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d. 
1066, 1071." 
It is clear that the intent and purpose of the law is to 
allow the unique situation of each divorce to be considered in its 
own light on its own facts and with broad deference being given to 
the trial judge's discretion and judgment. 
The foregoing considerations strongly support the trial 
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judge's discretion and judgment. 
The foregoing considerations strongly support the trial 
court's decision in this case. The parties were married for 
about eleven (11) years. During most of that time the wife was 
the sole or substantial financial supporter of the family. The 
standard of living enjoyed by the family was substantially the 
result of the wife's productivity. She was awarded the child. 
The small amount of child support assessed against the husband 
was in recognition of the mother's continuing role as a working 
mother and the father's education, training, good health and 
employment capability. 
The major asset of the marriage was the contract of pur-
chase of Coryell Answering Service from the wife's parents. The 
business was commenced in 1955 by her parents when the wife was 
age eleven (11). Wife worked continuously with the business ex-
cept for a twenty-six (26) month interval. The sole reason the 
sellers sold to the parties hereto was because of the parent-
daughter relationship between the sellers and the wife. The ac-
quisition of this asset was made possible only by the desire of 
the wife's parents to keep the business in the family. 
The relative capabilities of the parties was introduced 
at the trial. The wife managed and operated the business; whereas, 
the husband did not participate. The division of property was 
very generous to the husband. The type of service generates bus-
iness income in proportion to the manager's skill. The wife is 
the only one that has demonstrated such ability. Nevertheless, 
the husband was awarded $11,000.00 for whatever contribution he 
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may have made to the business, to be paid at not less than $500.00 
per month at eight percent (8%) per annum. The husband is to pay 
no alimony. 
For the wife to maintain her standard of living and provide 
for the reasonable support of their child she must continue to op-
erate the business profitably in a very competitive and uncertain 
market. 
It is significant to note that at Pages 2, 3 of appellant's 
brief he cites the husbandfs attainment of a degree in business 
management (R-48) but at Page 15 of appellant's brief he notes 
that the husband was at the time of the divorce working in con-
struction on an hourly basis of $4.00 an hour with a maximum net 
weekly income of $139.00 if fully employed (R-205). It is appar-
ent that the husband is not utilizing his skills and training for 
maximum profitability and had perpetuated the economic dependancy 
upon his wife that existed during the period of the marriage (R-55,56). 
At Page 3 of appellant's brief he refers to the father of 
appellee as being age 75 and desirous of selling the business (R-103). 
The testimony was that the father was 75 at the time of the trial. 
The time of the sale of the business, July 1, 1973 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "A"), the wife's father was twelve (12) years younger. 
The significant date, of course, is the date of the sale not the 
date of his testimony. The wife and her father both testified 
that the motivation for selling the business to the parties to 
this action was the wife's training, experience and fidelity to 
the business since she was age eight (8) and the trial court pro-
perly concluded that he did not believe the transaction was fully 
an arms-length transaction (R-2 30). 
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Appellant develops figures based upon the testimony of 
one witness only (disregarding the other three experts who 
testified) regarding hypothetical formulas that the business 
could realize and how, based thereon, it should be valued. As-
suming, without admitting, that the appellant's hypothetical 
calculations have some validity, appellee submits that they are 
immaterial inasmuch as the evidence that the trial court based 
its judgment on is clear that the motivation for the sellers 
(the wife's parents) to sell the business that they had estab-
lished and built over an approximate twelve (12) year period is 
that they wanted to maintain the business in the family and that 
their daughter (appellee) had been trained in the business from 
the time she was age eight (8). Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" reflects 
that no down payment was required. It is evident that the payments 
for the purchase were to come from operating revenues. The oper-
ating revenues were the result of the wife's, not the husband's, 
entrepreneurship in managing and promoting the business. There 
is nothing in the record to show that the husband had appreciable 
earnings concurrent with the wife's operation of the business 
which could have been contributed to the installment payments re-
quired by Plaintiff's Exhibit "A". Therefore, the incentive for 
the sale and the accomplishment of the sale terms were the sole 
and exclusive result of the wife's relationship to the sellers 
and her perpetuation of her parents' business, none of which is 
attributable to the husband. Therefore, it is immaterial which 
of the formulae the trial court applied in determining value. 
It is apparent that the court gave some consideration to the re-
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lationship between the parties hereto for whatever business or 
non-business reason and made a discretionary award to the husband 
in view of that. 
Appellant at Pages 6, 1 of his brief advances an argument 
regarding improvements to the real property and how the improve-
ments are treated for income tax purposes. The argument essen-
tially is one of how the tax accountant should handle the expen-
ditures for income tax deduction purposes and not one of the 
enhancement of the business property values. 
Defendant's Exhibit 6 which accounts for the improvements 
made on the real property by the appellant and the wife's father 
(who was 75 at the time of the trial and obviously not at the time 
of the improvements, for whatever significance that may hold) does 
not delineate between the amounts spent for the residential area 
which the husband would normally provide for a wife, and what, if 
any, might properly be allocated to improvement of the business 
area of the edifice. However, this must have been a factor for 
the trial judgefs $11,000.00 award to the husband, in any event. 
The husband seems to argue at Page 12 of appellant's brief 
that he was competent to manage the business based upon his achie-
ving a degree in business management and having been employed as 
a supervisor of a business in California (R-81). However, there 
is no testimony to show that the type of training and experience 
that the husband had received was particularly qualifying for this 
type of specialized service business, nor, is there any evidence 
that the wife used any coercion, duress or undue influence to 
-7-
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restrain the husband from participating in the business. It is 
consistent, as the wife and her father testified (R-834), that 
the husband was not actively involved because he was not trained 
nor qualified for this particular business enterprise. Further-
more , it is significant that there is no evidence of appreciable 
earnings from any source by the business-qualified husband from 
the date of the contract (plaintiff's Exhibit "A") to the date 
of the trial of this case. There is evidence that the trial court 
had substantial evidence before it to determine an equitable 
division of the business assets of the parties and that an equitable 
distribution was ordered by the court. Certainly, it cannot cog-
ently be argued that the naked oral offer by the husband to the 
wife to purchase the business assets is a sound basis for deter-
mining values and equitable division of the business properties 
(R-211). There is nothing in the record to show that the offeror 
had the particular qualification to perpetuate this specialized 
service business nor had the capability of paying the amount of-
fered. 
POINT II 
THE HUSBAND SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT. 
It is noteworthy that the husband argues in Point I of 
his brief that he would be competent to operate this specialized 
business if afforded the opportunity; however, in Point II he 
states he is unable to otherwise earn more than a maximum net 
weekly income of $139.00. 
Even if this is an accurate indication of his earning 
-8-
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capacity, $75.00 per month would only be thirteen percent (13%) 
of his monthly income. If the $500.00 per month from his portion 
of the business is included, $75.00 per month would only be 
seven percent (7%) of his monthly income. An award of $75.0 0 
per month child support is clearly reasonable in the circumstances. 
The appellee agrees with the case cited by appellant in 
his brief and especially that the facts and circumstances in each 
particular case will govern such decision. The trial judge looked 
at the totality of the circumstances of the parties and entered a 
just, equitable award of child support. It would be paternally 
and socially irresponsible for a healthy and trained father to 
have no responsibility for the support and maintenance of his only 
child. Of course, it is well established that child support awards 
are in personam and may be reviewed by the court any time when 
there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of the 
parties. It has not been argued by either party that their cir-
cumstances or the circumstances of their child has substantially 
changed since the trial court entered its decree relating to child 
support. 
Appellant cites no authority, and appellee cannot discover 
any, which holds that disparity in income precludes the father's 
responsibility for assisting in the support of his children. In 
any event, an award of $75.0 0 per month for the support of their 
only child is clearly only a portion of the total financial require-
ment for sustaining him. Therefore, it is evident that the trial 
court has pro-rated the responsibility between the parties. 
-9-
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CONCLUSION 
The law in Utah is well established that each property 
settlement in a divorce action is to be judged on its own unique 
circumstances, with broad latitude being given to the trial judge's 
discretion. 
The appellant has not demonstrated any persuasive legal 
authority or factual circumstances that would sustain a reversal 
of the trial court's judgment. Consequently, the trial court's 
judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLENN J. MECHAM, ESQ. 
Attorney for Respondent 
2 50 6 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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